Introduction 25
Thanks to television detectives and their ilk, the public are by now familiar with criminals 26 leaving their DNA at the scene of a crime -allowing the police to quickly identify 27 perpetrators, as well as linking them to any other crimes they may have committed. Even if 28 there is no arrest before the end credits, DNA profiles derived from samples retrieved from 29 crime scenes can be stored in a database, and later used to find a 'matching' suspect. In real 30 life, this practice of storing DNA retrieved from crime scenes in a database has led directly to 31 convictions in high profile crimes, such as that of the 1984 rape and murder of Melanie Road 32 [1, 2] . 1 The utility of DNA in such serious crimes has helped secure significant financial 33 investment and political commitment to expand forensic DNA databases. Yet, while the 34 value of a DNA database in individual (particularly unsolved) cases is easy to find, (most 35 often in media reports), the aggregate value of a DNA database remains unascertained. 36
In fact, it might be presumed from the prevalence of acclaim in the media, and the 37 significance attached to a DNA 'match' by criminal justice agents, that DNA databases make 38 a vital contribution to criminal justice aims. In just one recent example from Australia, the 39 Police Minister stated that: 'We know DNA is a more effective way for police to prosecute 40 and solve crime', arguing that expanding DNA databases will 'help bring down high harm 41 and high volume crimes… -helping police solve thousands of unsolved crimes and helping to 42 catch serious offenders more easily' [3] . Such claims prompt the question of how it is known 43 that DNA is 'more effective', as the authority, reliability and relevance of claims made for 44 The primary purpose of a forensic DNA database is to provide the police with intelligence on 51 who may have been present at the scene of a crime, particularly where the identity of the 52 participant(s) is unknown [7] . A database of DNA profiles from crime scenes may also 53 provide intelligence on the existence of 'links' between different crime scenes, potentially 54 identifying serial offenders and aiding in the analysis of crime patterns [8, 9] . To determine 55 how well the UK DNA database assists in the performance of these tasks, a measure must be 56 made of the 'effectiveness' of the database; gauging the level at which the actual outcomes 57 of the system meet expectations [10] . Another closely related indicator is efficiency, which 58 is a measure of the value or worth of a system by comparing its actual outcomes to that of 59 alternative systems or a cost/input-benefit analysis of a system [11, 12] . In the context of 60 forensic DNA databasing and criminal investigation, an effective database should contain 61 both subject reference profiles and crime scene profiles and generate relevant matches that 62 contribute to the prevention, detection, and prosecution of crime -i.e. make a net 63 contribution to public security. An efficient forensic DNA database system should result in 64 better public security outcomes from use of the DNA database than alternative systems, or 65 at the very least, its public security outcomes should merit the input required, (the 'costs') 66 M A N U S C R I P T
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In fact, during the time of rapid expansion of the database, the number of crimes detected 135 using the NDNAD fell in 2004/05 and did not significantly increase in the following 3 years 136 [37, 39] . Such outcomes, despite massive government investment during the 'DNA 137
Expansion Programme' (-intended to improve the effectiveness of the NDNAD) led to the 138 characterisation of DNA as 'a fresh filling between two slices of stale bread' [40] . 139
The expansion of the database to include all arrestees (regardless of conviction status) 140 raised privacy concerns and was unsuccessfully challenged through the UK courts, 141 following DNA profiling or within 6 months of collection. 6 The DNA profiles of convicted 149 adults and some juveniles are indefinitely retained while juveniles convicted of a first minor 150 offence with a sentence of less than 5 years can be retained for 5 years plus the length of 151 sentence. For unconvicted individuals, DNA profiles of those charged for a serious offence 152 are subject to an automatic 3 years retention plus a 2 years renewal with consent of the 153 court. The same rule applies to those arrested for a serious offence (but not charged) but 154 the first 3 years retention requires consent of a Biometrics Commissioner established under 155
PoFA. Other temporal/short retention periods apply to those issued with a penalty notice 156 for disorder or where a 'national security determination' is made. 7 All other arrestees 157 and/or charged individuals are subject to retention until the conclusion of the police 158 investigation or any proceedings. The application to the ECtHR had been made by two unconvicted individuals, 'S' (a minor at the time of sampling) and Marper, both of whom had requested for the destruction of their biometric records (DNA and fingerprints) following their acquittal and discontinuation of proceedings, respectively. 6 Samples -the human material from which the DNA profile was derived, used to be retained as well as the computer profile. 7 A 'National Security Determination' is a writ by a Chief Constable to extend the retention period of DNA records from an unconvicted individual on national security grounds. 8 For detailed discussion of the implementation of PoFA, see Amankwaa and McCartney [15] .
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Page 7 of 32 Underlying the Marper decision was a lack of empirical evidence demonstrating the utility of 160 retained DNA records from unconvicted individuals. Ten years on, this knowledge gap has 161 not been closed. Decisions on who should be included on the database and how long to 162 retain their data to maximise the effectiveness of the database, are still not grounded in 163 evidence. Whilst the match rate of the NDNAD has increased following the introduction of 164
PoFA, this statistical data is limited in its ability to demonstrate public security outcomes. 165
Attempts to date to measure 'effectiveness', with outcomes identified from the literature 166 are discussed in the next section. 167 3 Measuring 'effectiveness' 168
Indicators for 'effectiveness' 169
Analysis of the literature reveals seven 'outcomes' or 'indicators' by which the effectiveness 170 of a forensic DNA database could be assessed. [7, 17, 26, [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] . 10 The 'crime solving' capacity of any DNA database is limited to resolving those crimes where DNA is present and detected (and leads to a 'hit' on a database). For example, this will exclude almost all so-called 'white collar' crime that will rarely involve DNA, and 'cybercrime' will almost certainly not involve DNA. So a large proportion of recorded crime will not have a 'crime scene', or will not have the potential for DNA to play a role in the investigation [59] . See later the 'link to outcomes' measures (section 3.2.2). 'measures' or isolating metrics that could be used to measure these seven outcomes. 251
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The case resolution effectiveness of forensic DNA databases can be framed within two 253 contexts ("effectiveness context"): 254 1) its contribution to the resolution of crimes where DNA from the crime scene is 255 loaded on the database ('DNA-related crime'); and 256
2) its impact on the resolution of all recorded crime. 257
Effectiveness context one: DNA-related crimes 258
In the first context, several approaches have been taken to measure the 'effectiveness' 259 (performance or success rate) of forensic DNA databases, the majority focussing upon 260 matches generated ('hits') and investigations aided ('link to outcome'), both described as 261 output metrics [50] . 'Hits' are matches obtained from the database, either between known 262 individuals and crime scene samples or matches between different crime scene samples. 263 These can be further categorised by offence type or for different categories of individuals. 264
Where a DNA hit contributes to the investigation of an offence, this is counted as an 265 investigation aided; the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses this 266 metric. 13 In the UK, the rate at which DNA was 'linked to outcome' is reported, i.e. 267 associated with a suspect being charged or cautioned for an offence for example. 268
Match rates 269
The NDNAD Strategy Board reports the 'match rate', which measures the chance that a 270 crime scene profile loaded on the database matches the DNA data of a known individual. 271
This shows the 'potential' crime solving capacity of the database. The match rate can also be 272 computed for crime scene profiles or the chance of a loaded subject profile matching a 273 stored crime scene profile. The match rate is calculated by dividing the number of matches 274 between loaded crime scene profiles and retained subject profiles by the total number of 275 crime scene profiles loaded. As of December 2018, the NDNAD holds >6 million subject 276 profiles and >600,000 crime scene profiles for example eyewitness account, CCTV or fingerprinting, assuming identity was ever in 292 doubt (in that they were not caught 'in flagrante'). Thirdly, the database also includes 293 duplicate profiles (currently >13% for the NDNAD) [72] . The match report does not 294 differentiate between duplicate hits and genuine hits. These factors diminish the value of 295 the match rate metric in assessing the success of the NDNAD in the first effectiveness 296
context. The shortcomings of the match rate thus make it necessary to develop further 297 output and outcome metrics, leading to attempts to collect data on the link between hits 298 and case outcomes. Although the RCOF rates provide further insight on the usefulness of DNA hits, it still lacks 318 clarity on how the matches contribute to crime resolution and the outcome of cases. The 319 available data, however, shows that, upon further filtering, the proportion of profiles loaded 320 on the database that lead to case resolution after a hit may be lower than the match rate 321 and RCOF rate. 322
Effectiveness context two: all recorded crime 323
The second "effectiveness context" of the NDNAD is its impact on the resolution of all 324 or Low copy number (LCN) DNA (12%)). The profiling success of the crime scene DNA was 391 found to be 60% for SGM+ DNA and 18% for LCN DNA. The match rate for SGM+ DNA was 392 73.3% whilst LCN DNA was 66.7%. Overall, 4% of visited scenes led to the detection of crime 393 using DNA matches. It was estimated that ~10% of property crimes are detected by the 394 police and both fingerprints and DNA contribute to about 33.3% of these detections. The 395 sole contribution of DNA and/or the NDNAD to the clear-up rates was not estimated. 396
Nevertheless, the study showed that though DNA evidence appears to play a crucial role in 397 property crime, its overall contribution to crime resolution remains very low. The findings generally suggest that DNA databases are more useful in solving a specific type 420 of cases and has a potential impact on offenders of certain characteristics. It is imperative 421 that evaluative studies on the actual effectiveness of databases are carried out to identify 422 characteristic patterns in the small number of applicable cases. This will ensure that 423 databases are cost-effective and focused to assist the Police. 424
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Comparison of cases involving DNA and cases without DNA 425
The 'ultimate' outcomes of DNA hits, in terms of demonstrating how DNA contributed to a 426 criminal case and how the case was resolved, are preferable over proxy output metrics such 427 were still under investigation or yet to be tried in court. It was expected that the progress of 488 pending cases could lead to ~70% judicial resolution. When broken down by offence type, 489 the potential case progression/judicial resolution rate for sexual cases (n = 110) was ~50%, 490 homicide (n = 24) was ~91%, burglary (n = 42) was 88% and other crimes was 40%. 491
For the third performance metric, the criminal history of 12 recidivistic sex felons was 492 of legal systems, the age of the database, previous changes in law, and differences in 558 counting database hits. Moreover, the classification of the legal systems may be too broad 559 both within and between the two categories. A further useful analysis to determine the 560 impact of the law and the value of DNA databasing could be filtering the performance ratio 561 by retention category, retention time, and crime type in a single state [105, 106] . Though 562 there were genuine reasons for using the H/N metric, analysis of the crime-solving match 563 rate -H/C could be useful in demonstrating the potential contribution of the database to 564 public security. A research programme using both H/C and H/N for different retention 565 regimes, inclusion criteria and retention lengths in a single state could offer a new 566 understanding of the potential effectiveness of databases. 567 Finally, another model used to assess database effectiveness is the instrument variable (IV) 568 strategy developed by Doleac [107] . The model was used to test the effect of DNA 569 databases on crime in the United States [107] . Firstly, the study analysed the criminal 570 history of offenders before and after DNA expansion in 7 states. The probability of re-571 convicting serious violent and property offenders was reduced by 17% and 6%, respectively, 572 M A N U S C R I P T
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Page 22 of 32 within 5 years of expansion. Secondly, the size of the DNA database was compared to crime 573 rates from 2000 to 2010. The growth of the database was associated with 7-45% and 5-35% 574 decrease in violent and property crimes, respectively. Analysis of the cost-effectiveness of 575 using DNA databases to investigate serious offences showed lower marginal cost than other 576 alternative crime-fighting measures (<$600 versus $7,600 (longer sentences) or $26,300-577 62,500 (police officers)). The results of this study were consistent with a similar study by 578 Doleac et al. [108] that assessed the effectiveness of the Denmark DNA Database (DDD) 579 using the IV strategy. An expansion of the DDD in 2005 was associated with a subsequent 580 reduction in recidivism rate by 26% within 5 years and an increase in crime detection by 581 0.09 crimes. 582
The IV strategy was also used by Doleac [109] to test the cross-state effect of DNA database 583 policies in the USA. The study compared DNA database size and crime rates among states. It 584 was found that an increase in the total size of databases in external states increases violent 585 (0.0001) and property (0.0003) crime rates in the reference state (p < 0.05). Also, an 586 increase in the size of a nearby state's database (< 500 miles) increases violent (0.0011) and 587 property (0.0063) crime rates (p < 0.01). A similar trend was observed when the total 588 profiles of external states were weighted by distance. Expansion of a nearby state database 589 (100 miles) results in higher violent (0.0012 versus 0.00004) and property (0.0042 versus 590 0.00004) crime rates than far away states (3000 miles). It was hypothesised that expansive 591 DNA database policies in one state lead to migration of criminals whilst restrictive policies 592 draw in criminals. An alternative effect is that the former lead to incapacitation or 593 deterrence of crime thereby reducing crime across states. The results of the study 594 demonstrated a negative cross-state effect. It was recommended that to limit migration of 595 criminals, states must ensure equivalency in their DNA database policies. 596
In summary, the three IV strategy-based studies demonstrate that expansive DNA databases 597 could reduce crime rates and limit criminal activity. However, the results should be 598 interpreted cautiously since the data relied upon were estimates -which may not be 599 representative of the actual effects of DNA databases. Secondly, there are many 600 confounders associated with criminal activity and crime rates in a specific state including 601 age, gender, family structure, cultural context, educational level of residents, alternative law 602 enforcement resources, employment and other crime-reduction policies. These factors were Until such time as data along these lines are available, we remain a long way from gathering 644 the evidence that could establish how effective the UK NDNAD is, and whether the taking of 645 half a million DNA profiles a year and the storing of over 6 million profiles is worthwhile. 646
What we do know is that the limited knowledge of the effectiveness of DNA continues to be 647 a prominent theme in the annual reports of the UK's Biometrics Commissioner [51, 59, 110] . 648
The public may be willing to sacrifice some of their privacy for societal benefits, but if the 649 benefits cannot be evidenced, or remain elusive, then that sacrifice may be questioned [82] . 650
This knowledge gap then remains critical as understanding effectiveness enables measures 651 to be implemented to maximize the utility of the NDNAD. In the absence of meaningful 652 statistics and case evaluation, it is hard to deduce the optimal scale and arrangements for 653 an effective DNA database that enhances public security while protecting individual rights. 654
There therefore needs to be continuing public debate over the police use and retention of 655 DNA. Far from being a catch-all solution to modern crime, a case still needs to be made for 656 DNA evidence -apart, of course, from on TV detective shows. 657
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